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Antecedents of Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure: A Post-2007/08 Financial Crisis 
Evidence from the Influential UK Combined Code 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: This study investigates the level of compliance with, and disclosure of, good corporate 
governance (CG) practices among UK publicly listed firms, and consequently ascertains whether 
board characteristics and ownership structure variables can explain observable differences in the 
extent of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The study uses one of the largest datasets to-date on compliance 
and disclosure of CG practices from 2008 to 2013 containing 120 CG provisions drawn from the 
2010 UK Combined Code relating to 100 UK listed firms to conduct multiple regression analyses of 
the determinants of voluntary CG disclosures. A number of additional estimations, including two 
stage least squares, fixed-effects and lagged structures, are conducted in order to test the robustness 
of the findings.  
Findings: The results suggest that there is a substantial variation in the levels of compliance with, 
and disclosure of, good CG practices among the sampled UK firms. We also find that firms with 
larger board size, more independent outside directors and greater director diversity tend to disclose 
more CG information voluntarily, whereas the level of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure is 
insignificantly related to the existence of a separate CG committee and institutional ownership. 
Additionally, the results indicate that block ownership and managerial ownership impact negatively 
on voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. The findings are fairly robust across a number 
of econometric models that sufficiently address various endogeneity problems and alternative CG 
indices. Overall, the findings are generally consistent with the predictions of neo-institutional theory. 
Originality/Value: This paper extends, as well as contributes to the extant CG literature by offering 
new evidence on compliance with, and disclosure of, good CG recommendations contained in the 
2010 UK Combined Code following the 2007/08 global financial crisis. This paper also advances the 
existing literature by offering new insights from a neo-institutional theoretical perspective of the 
impact of board and ownership mechanisms on voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices. 
Keywords: Corporate governance; Board and ownership mechanisms; Comply or explain; Neo-
institutional theory; UK Combined Code 
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1. Introduction 
 
This study seeks to extend, as well as contribute to the extant literature by: (i) investigating why 
and how UK listed firms may voluntarily comply with, and disclose information relating to CG 
recommendations contained in the influential 2010 UK Combined Code; and (ii) consequently 
examining whether ownership and board characteristics can explain observable differences in CG 
compliance and disclosure practices with specific focus on providing new empirical insights 
following the 2007/08 global financial crisis. Our analysis is informed by a neo-institutional 
theoretical perspective.  
The last decade has witnessed an increased interest in the extent of voluntary CG compliance and 
disclosure practices (Conyon & Mallin, 1997; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Melis et al., 2015; Ntim et 
al., 2012b, Pass, 2006; Waweru, 2014). Whilst varied justifications have been provided to explain 
why firms may voluntarily disclose information relating to their CG practices (Hussainey & Al‐
Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim, 2015; Al-Bassam et al., 2016; Ntim et al., 2016), 
recent theoretical advancements indicate that institutional context and theory can explain the 
considerable growth in the issuance and/or adoption of codes of CG practices around the world 
(Adegbite, 2015; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008; Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2016). Particularly, and from neo-
institutional theoretical perspective, institutional forces (e.g., political, social and economic 
institutions) can influence the spread and/or the imposition of business norms/practices on firms 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; Scott, 2001). These institutional forces have generally been 
suggested to be driven by two main reasons: efficiency (‘substantive management’) and legitimation 
(‘symbolic management’) (Adegbite, 2015; Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Observably, neo-
institutional theoretical perspective has been employed by prior studies in explaining the institutional 
forces, which can facilitate or constrain the diffusion of corporate practices at the national-level of 
analysis, including the adoption of international financial reporting standards (Maroun & Van-Zijl, 
2015), CG standards (Adegbite, 2015; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008) and CSR practices (Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013). By contrast, neo-institutional theoretical perspective has rarely been employed 
towards explaining the rapid adoption of good CG standards at the firm-level of analysis. Arguably, 
this limits current understanding of institutional forces that may be able to explain the rapid 
proliferation of good CG standards at the firm level. 
Accordingly, this study aims to extend, as well as contribute to the current literature by applying 
neo-institutional theoretical perspective to explain differences in CG practices and with specific 
focus on the efficiency and legitimation implications of neo-institutional theory. The neo-
institutional (efficiency view) perspective proposes that institutional pressures (i.e., coercive, 
mimetic and normative pressures) can force economic entities to compete strongly to gain access to 
critical resources which can maximise the wealth of shareholders (Adegbite, 2015; Zattoni & 
Cuomo, 2008). Hence, committing to high levels of accountability/transparency in the form of 
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engaging in increased voluntary1 CG disclosure can allow firms to gain access to crucial resources 
by improving their reputation and goodwill (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Additionally, greater 
engagement in voluntary CG disclosures can improve the performance of economic entities by 
reducing the conflict of interest between management and owners through improvement in the flow 
of information between them (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Similarly, the legitimation view of neo-institutional theory proposes that coercive pressures can 
force corporations to behave according to socially accepted standards/conventions. This is because 
conforming to such socially expected and accepted standards/conventions can improve legitimacy of 
a company’s operations and also enhance its social acceptance (Duff, 2015; Suchman, 1995). 
Therefore, committing to good CG practices can be one way by which corporate goals may be 
aligned with those of the larger society, and that can in turn help legitimise corporate operations via 
improved corporate image and reputation. Furthermore, the need to keep good relationships with 
powerful corporate stakeholders (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), and thus improving corporate reputation 
and image, can compel economic entities to conform to or voluntarily mimic socially expected and 
accepted standards/conventions (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). For instance, greater commitment to good 
governance standards in the form of engaging in greater CG disclosures may improve the legitimacy 
of firms by gaining the support of influential stakeholders, including shareholders and governments, 
who are central to the ability of corporations to maintain sustainable operations (Zattoni & Cuomo, 
2008).  
Due to various reasons underlying corporate disclosure behaviour, previous research has 
investigated the extent, motives and antecedents of voluntary disclosure practices (Cooke, 1992; 
Botosan, 1997; Barako et al., 2006). However, the existing voluntary disclosure literature has a 
number of observable weaknesses. First, despite the importance of good CG practices and the 
considerable amount of CG reforms that have been pursued worldwide (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004), existing voluntary disclosure literature is primarily focused on investigating general financial 
disclosures (Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006), social and environmental 
disclosures (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015; Grougiou et al., 2016; Reverte, 2009) and risk 
disclosures (Cabedo & Tirado, 2004; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Ntim et al., 2013). In contrast, 
studies examining why and how public corporations may voluntarily comply with and disclose 
information about their CG practices are scarce (Adegbite, 2015; Pass, 2006; Bozec & Bozec, 2007).  
Second, the few studies that have examined voluntary disclosure of CG practices are impaired in 
that they measure compliance indirectly through a survey (Adegbite, 2015; Conyon, 1994; Conyon 
& Mallin, 1997)/subjective analysts ratings (Patel et al., 2002; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2012) or 
investigate a small number of CG provisions (Arcot et al., 2010; Padgett & Shabbir, 2005), and 
thereby arguably limiting the generalisability of their findings. Third, despite increasing theoretical 
                                               
       1  It should be noted that the term ‘voluntary disclosure’ used in this paper refers to the voluntary CG compliance/disclosure regime 
that has been popularised by the UK’s 1992 Cadbury Report in contrast to the ‘comply or else’ (mandatory) CG compliance and disclosure 
regime, which has been advocated by the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Thus, the operationalisation of the ‘voluntary disclosure’ terminology in 
this case is different from the traditional understanding of reporting over and above mandatory disclosure requirements. 
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and empirical suggestions that relying on a neo-institutional theoretical perspective can help in 
explaining the varied reasons often underlying corporate voluntary disclosures (Ntim et al., 2013b), 
existing studies are either mainly descriptive (Patel et al., 2002; Waweru, 2014) or have used this 
theory to examine institutional forces that influence adoption of CG standards mainly at a national 
level of analysis (Adegbite, 2015; Judge et al., 2010;  Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). In contrast, studies 
employed neo-institutional theoretical perspectives to examine issues relating to the adoption of 
good CG standards at the firm level are rare. Arguably, this impedes our ability to fully understand 
and explain the different managerial motives for voluntary CG disclosures.  
Fourth, notwithstanding increasing suggestions that poor CG practices partly contributed to the 
2007/08 global financial crisis (FRC, 2010a, b, 2012a, b), there seems to be generally inadequate 
empirical evidence and serious academic reflections on its effects on CG and disclosure practices 
(Ferri & Maber, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013). Finally, despite the theoretical and empirical indications 
that corporate decisions, such as disclosure is mainly a function of top management and ownership 
structure (Ntim et al., 2012a), existing literature have largely examined how general firm attributes 
(e.g., size, leverage and liquidity) can influence voluntary disclosure of CG practices (Cooke. 1992; 
Patel et al., 2002; Waweru, 2014). This also limits current understanding of the extent to which 
corporate board and ownership characteristics can affect voluntary disclosure of CG practices. 
Given the apparent weaknesses of the extant literature, we seek to examine voluntary CG 
disclosure behaviour among listed UK corporations. The UK offers a particularly interesting context 
to conduct the current study for the following reasons. First, since 1992, the UK has been in the 
leading position of pursuing global CG reforms (e.g., Cadbury Report, 1992; Greenbury Report, 
1995; Hampel Report, 1998; Turnbull Report, 1999; Higgs Report, 2003; Smith Report, 2003; FRC, 
2010a, b, 2012a, b). For example, the influential 1992 Cadbury Report, which promoted the concept 
of voluntary CG compliance regime (‘comply or explain’), has been adopted by almost every 
country in the world. As will be discussed further and since 1992, over 30 good CG guides have 
been produced and consolidated into the ‘Combined Code’. Thus, a study of this nature will have 
important implications not just for the UK, but also for CG reforms that have been pursued around 
the world. Second, apart from pursuing influential CG reforms, public corporations have relatively 
dispersed ownership structure, suggesting that voluntary compliance regime (‘comply or explain’) 
may be appropriate (MacNeil & Li, 2006). Third, the UK has a fairly strong track record of applying 
and imposing corporate regulations with stronger level of shareholder activism. The market for 
corporate, capital, service, product and managerial control is also fairly strong. Arguably, these 
contextual characteristics render the UK a germane environment to examine voluntary CG disclosure 
behaviour. 
In fact, it is somewhat an empirical anomaly that only a small number of previous studies have 
sought to investigate voluntary CG disclosures among UK listed corporations despite the powerful 
nature of its governance reforms with observable limitations (Conyon, 1994; Conyon & Mallin, 
1997;  Pass, 2006; Arcot et al., 2010; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-Young, 2012; 
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Shrives & Brennan, 2015). For example, Conyon (1994) and Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012) 
examine voluntary CG disclosures among UK firms by employing a survey and subjective analysts 
rankings, respectively. Similarly, Pass (2006) and Arcot et al. (2010) examine only a small number 
of CG provisions. Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) only analyse small and medium size firms listed on 
the AIM (alternative investment market), whilst Shrives and Brennan (2015) focused only on 
analysing the quality of CG explanations for non-compliance with the recommendations of 2003 and 
2010 codes among largest UK listed firms. Hence, this study aims to broaden the current 
understanding, as well as contribute to existing studies in several ways. First, we contribute to the 
extant literature by offering new evidence on compliance with, and disclosure of, good CG 
recommendations included in the 2010 UK Combined Code by constructing the most comprehensive 
CG compliance and disclosure index to-date, consisting of 120 CG provisions. Second, we advance 
the existing literature by providing evidence on the extent to which corporate board characteristics 
and ownership structure variables can explain observable changes in voluntary CG disclosures. 
Third, we contribute to existing literature by offering new insights from a neo-institutional 
theoretical perspective to interpret voluntary CG disclosure behaviours. Finally, we offer a timely 
new empirical insights relating to CG structures and disclosure practices following the 2007/08 
global financial crisis. 
Our evidence two-fold; first, our findings indicate that the level of compliance with, and 
disclosure of, good CG recommendations included in the 2010 Combined Code is generally high, but 
varies substantially among the sampled corporations. Second, we find that board size, the proportion 
of independent outside directors and board diversity are significantly and positively related to 
voluntary CG disclosures, whereas the presence of a separate CG committee and institutional 
ownership have a positive, but insignificant association with voluntary CG disclosures. Additionally, 
managerial and block ownership impact negatively on the levels of voluntary CG disclosures. Our 
findings are fairly robust across a number of econometric models that sufficiently address various 
endogeneity concerns and alternative CG indices. Overall, our findings are largely in line with the 
expectations of neo-institutional theoretical perspective. 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly considers CG disclosure policy 
reforms in the UK. The following sections present the theoretical framework, review the empirical 
literature and develop hypotheses, outline the research methodology, and discuss the findings of the 
paper. The concluding remarks of the paper are provided in the final section. 
2. CG, Disclosure Policy Reforms and the UK Corporate Context 
 
Policy-makers and shareholders became more concern about the need to improve and reform CG 
practices in the UK at the end of 1980s when several corporate scandals emerged (Waweru, 2014). 
This period was characterised by a weak link between corporate financial performance and executive 
directors’ pay, limited role of auditors and rampant cases of  expropriation of shareholders’ wealth 
by opportunistic managers (Pye, 2000). In particular, a number of well-known corporate scandals, 
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including the failure of the Barings Bank, occurred (Waweru, 2014). These corporate scandals 
impaired significantly the confidence of investors and were imputed mainly to weak CG practices 
involving lack of accountability and transparency among senior corporate executives (Conyon & 
Mallin, 1997; Pass, 2006). Consequently, the Cadbury Committee was founded in 1991 with the aim 
of promoting high standards of CG by enhancing accountability and transparency practices in UK 
listed corporations. The Cadbury Committee issued its final report in 1992, which has been an 
influential driver for CG reforms that have been pursued in different countries worldwide (Aguilera 
& Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). However, a notable limitation of the Cadbury Report is that it focused 
mainly on the financial aspects of CG and neglected other equally important aspects of governance, 
such as executive pay, risk management, and internal controls (Ntim et al., 2012a, b).  
Therefore, the recommendations contained in the Cadbury Report have been reviewed and 
expanded by a number of predecessor reports (Greenbury, 1995; Hampel, 1998; Turnbull, 1999; 
Higgs, 2003; and Smith, 2003). For example and briefly, the 1995 Greenbury Report sought to 
address the thorny issue of remuneration practices among UK listed corporations with particular 
focus on improving the link between executive directors’ pay and performance through increased 
disclosure of information relating to the pay of a company’s executives. The 1998 Hampel Report 
consolidated the CG recommendations that were contained in the 1992 Cadbury and 1995 Greenbury 
Reports, permitting its Committee to issue the first UK Combined Code in 1998. The 1999 Turnbull 
Report sought to strengthen the crucial issue of internal controls and risk management among UK 
listed corporations. The 2003 Higgs Review focused on improving board independence by reviewing 
the role and effectiveness of independent outside directors. Similarly, the 2003 Smith Report focused 
on strengthening and reviewing the effectiveness of board subcommittees with specific focus on the 
role and effectiveness of audit committees. The recommendations of Higgs’ and Smith’s Reports 
were further consolidated with those of the 1998 Hampel’s Report, leading to the issuance of the 
second version of the UK Combined Code in 2003. The Combined Code has since been revised 
almost every two years, notably in 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014 (FRC, 2010a, b, 2012a, b). 
Table 1 summarises and compares the main recommendations contained in the different UK CG 
reforms that have been pursued over the last 20 years with specific focus on the 1992 Cadbury 
Report and 2010 the Combined Code. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Table 1 shows that most of CG recommendations contained in the UK codes/reports aim at 
protecting the interests of shareholders. These CG recommendations cover five main areas: (i) board 
leadership; (ii) board effectiveness; (iii) board accountability; (iv) executive pay; and (v) relations 
with shareholders. The first two areas which relate to ‘board leadership’ and ‘effectiveness’ seek to 
enhance the monitoring power and the independence of corporate boards by requiring greater 
transparency regarding board practices, including separating CEO and chairperson positions and 
requiring the chairperson of a firm’s board to be an independent director, amongst others. CG rules 
  
8 
 
relating to ‘accountability’ seek to improve risk management and control by requiring greater 
transparency about risk evaluation, risk management policies, and the presence of sufficient internal 
control and audit systems aimed at determining and minimising managerial fraud. CG provisions 
relating to ‘executive pay’ aim to enhance monitoring and control over executive pay by calling for 
higher disclosure and transparency about directors’ pay, such as disclosing information about the 
components of executives’ pay and remuneration policy. ‘Relations with shareholders’ CG 
provisions seek to ensure that the top management team consider the view of shareholders by 
encouraging continuous engagement, dialogue, and communication by corporate boards with major 
shareholders regarding issues relating to governance, strategy and executive pay.  
Additional to the focus of good CG practices contained in 1992 Cadbury Report and the 2010 
Combined Code on protecting shareholder interests, there are other CG regulations that aim to 
protect the interests of stakeholders (e.g., 2002 Hermes-Principles and 2006 Companies-Act) by 
encouraging listed corporations to involve in more disclosure of information relating to stakeholder 
CG practices. Furthermore, and as previously explained, apart from sustained and extensive CG 
reforms that have been aimed at promoting high standards of CG in listed corporations, UK firms are 
relatively characterised by disperse ownership structure, where institutional shareholders play an 
important role in monitoring boards and top management (Hussainey& Al‐Najjar, 2012). Thus, the 
features of: (i) disperse ownership structure; (ii) strong shareholder activism; (iii) a good track record 
of adopting and imposing corporate regulations; and (iv) active market for corporate, capital, service, 
product and managerial control (Ferri & Maber, 2013; Melis et al., 2015) have the capacity to 
encourage corporations to voluntarily comply with, and disclose information relating to their CG 
practices (MacNeil & Li, 2006; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012). This study, therefore, seeks to examine 
the extent to which UK listed firms voluntarily comply with, and disclose information relating to 
their CG practices and consequently, ascertain whether observable cross-sectional differences in 
such voluntary CG disclosures can be explained by ownership and board characteristics with specific 
focus on the period following the 2007/08 global financial crisis. 
3. A Neo-Institutional Theoretical Perspective and CG Disclosure Practices 
 
Although, the notion of “institution” has been viewed in diverse approaches (e.g., DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991; Scott, 2001) it generally points out to norms and regulations that allow or pose 
restrictions on the behaviours of actors in order to make their social life more significant (Judge et 
al., 2010). The institutional theoretical framework is considered to be useful in explaining the 
influence of higher level environment on lower level institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). 
The neo-institutional theoretical perspective suggested by Scott (2001) focuses on three levels of 
analysis, including societal institutions (it also refers to global institutions), institutional governance 
framework, and actors in institutional settings. The societal institutions provide the institutional 
context, where what is regarded to be acceptable means/models is proposed and enacted (Judge et 
al., 2010; Scott, 2001). Such institutions can affect lower level institutions by shaping, constraining, 
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and promoting structures at lower levels. At the middle level of model proposed by Scott is 
institutional governance structures, which consist of organisational fields (refer to corporations 
working in identical field, as indicated by providing services of similar nature) as well as of 
organisations themselves. The organisational level of analysis is also considered to be important, 
since corporations are diverse in size, complexity, structure and culture and they all impact, and are 
impacted by their institutional environments and organisational fields. Finally, actors in institutional 
settings are at the lowest level of the model proposed by Scott, comprising individuals/groups. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991) recognised three forms of institutional pressures within the 
bounds of neo-institutional theoretical framework. Briefly, the first type is “coercive or regulative”, 
which refers to the existence of institutions that can compel and/or influence actors to comply with 
CG practices. In our case, it refers, for example, to pressures of regulations and laws emanating from 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) and Financial Reporting Council (FRC) to comply with and disclose 
information relating to CG practices. The second type is “cognitive or mimetic”, which refers to the 
ability of actors to learn and copy the behaviour of other actors. This essentially suggests that a 
corporation might imitate others when complying with good CG practices. The final type of pressure 
is “normative”, which refers to expected and accepted behaviours within a social system. This 
indicates that complying with good CG practices may become a norm after a while and every 
corporation will comply with the code of good CG practices. Scott (2001) suggests that each of these 
three types of institutional pressures affect and can be affected by the forces of diffusion and also by 
the enforcement of institutional values and practices. These forces and constraints interplay to create 
similarities in processes, procedures, thoughts, structures and actions within institutional framework 
(“institutional isomorphism”).  
Neo-institutional theoretical perspective has been employed by prior studies at the national-level 
to explain the antecedents, which simulate/constrain the diffusion of a several corporate practices, 
including the adoption of international accounting practices (Maroun & Van-Zijl, 2015), CSR 
practices (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013), CG legitimacy (Judge et al., 2010) and the compliance with 
the recommendations of CG codes/standards (Adegbite, 2015; Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 
Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). However, this theory has hardly been employed at the firm-level to 
examine issues relating to CG practices. Hence, this study aims to extend, as well as contribute to the 
existing literature by employing neo-institutional (‘efficiency and legitimation views’) perspective to 
understand and explain differences (at the firm-level of analysis) in CG practices. 
In this regard, and from economic perspective, institutional scholars argue that institutions are 
important in determining the forces, which encourage society’s members (e.g., individuals, nations 
and companies) to get involve in profitable activities, including maximising shareholder wealth 
(Judge et al., 2010). Based on the economic approach of institutional theory, organisations primarily 
compete for resources (“economic efficiency”) to maximise their self-interests. Therefore, and from 
efficiency-led perspective, neo-institutional theory proposes that institutional pressures (i.e., 
coercive, mimetic, and normative), can be a strategic attempt to gain competitive advantages. In this 
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case, involving in good CG can improve efficiency by gaining access to the critical resources 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Additionally, committing to good CG practices can improve efficiency 
by reducing the agency/information asymmetry problems (Abdioglu et al., 2015; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).  
In contrast, and from sociological perspective, Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that corporations 
do not only aim to provide goods and services and make profit, they also have responsibilities 
towards the larger society. Organisations, based on sociological perspective, gain their authority to 
operate from the larger society and thus, they are also accountable to the larger society for their 
activities. In order for firms to survive, they need to legitimise their operation through conforming to 
socially expected and accepted standards/conventions (Suchman, 1995). Additionally, firms need not 
only to consider the rights of shareholders, but also the rights of the wider society (Ramanathan, 
1976). According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), the legitimacy and eventually the survival of 
firms can be threatened, if firms failed to conform to socially expected and accepted 
standards/conventions. Thus, from the sociological perspective, organisations not only strive to gain 
access to the critical resources, but they eventually desire to achieve social legitimacy and 
acceptance (Judge et al., 2010; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). Consistent with this perspective, CG 
system is deemed to be a crucial mechanism that ensures conforming to societal expectations. In 
particular, the legitimation-led perspective of neo-institutional theory suggests that firms need to 
commit to high levels of voluntary disclosure of information relating to stakeholder CG practices in 
order to legitimise their operations and survive (Reverte, 2009). 
4. CG and Voluntary Disclosure: Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
A number of factors have been identified by prior studies, which can impact on engaging in good 
CG practices (e.g., Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Barako et al., 2006; Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; 
Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim et al. 2012b). This study draws from this literature and the UK 
corporate context to identify possible antecedents of voluntary compliance with and disclosure of, 
good CG practices. In paricular, this study explores the impact of firm-level CG quality in the form 
of board characteristics (i.e., board size, the proportion of independent outside directors, board 
diversity, and the existence of a separate CG committee) and ownership structre variables (i.e., 
managerial ownership, institutional ownership and block ownership) on voluntary CG compliance 
and disclosure practices among UK listed firms. 
4.1. Corporate board characteristics  
 
4.1.1 Corporate board size 
Board size refers to the number of both inside and outside directors that serve on a corporate 
board. The efficiency view of neo-institutional theoretical framework proposes that larger boards are 
characterised by better decision-making and higher managerial monitoring (Ntim, 2015). This is 
because larger boards are less likely to be controlled by powerful chief executives in comparison 
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with smaller boards (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013), and as such, strategic decisions, including those 
relating to voluntary disclosure of CG practices can be scrutinised more effectively by larger boards. 
Therefore, since CG information becomes an important component of corporate voluntary 
disclosure, it is expected that corporations with larger boards are more likely to involve in increased 
disclosure of information relating to their CG practices compared with corporations with smaller 
boards. Similarly, and from a legitimisation neo-institutional theoretical perspective, larger boards 
considered to be more efficient in scrutinising and detecting opportunistic behaviours of managers 
(Zahra & Pearce, 1989). This due to that larger boards are often characterised by greater diversity in 
terms of experience, financial expertise, stakeholders’ representation, as well as capabilities to solve 
problems, which can improve firm reputation and image (Ntim, 2015). The greater diversity of 
stakeholders linked to larger boards may also increase the need of corporations to voluntarily 
disclosure information relating to their CG practices, and thus larger boards are expected to 
voluntarily commit to greater CG disclosures than their smaller counterparts. 
In contrast, Ciampi (2015) and John and Senbet (1998) advocate the view that smaller boards 
are more effective in scrutinising managerial opportunism, whereas larger boards are associated with 
coordination and communication problems among their members (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992) and thus, 
the implication of this is that as board’s size increases, there is a greater possibility that managers’ 
monitoring will decrease. Arguably, this can increase the possibility that larger boards may be 
controlled by powerful chief executives, and thus can influence adversely corporate voluntary 
disclosure behaviours, including those relating to CG practices.  
Notwithstanding the conflicting theoretical literature, however, a clear majority of prior 
empirical literature find a positive link among board size and corporate disclosure practices (e.g., 
Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Barako et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2012b). In contrast, there are other studies 
report that board size impacts negatively on corporate disclosure behaviour (e.g., Samaha et al., 
2012). Other studies did not find any link between board size and corporate disclosure practices  
(e.g., Cheng & Courtenay, 2006). In the UK context, prior studies (Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012; 
Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012) find a positive link between board size and voluntary CG disclosure 
practices. In addition, the 2010 UK Combined Code indicates that the board should be of a sufficient 
size in order to ensure that it is able to operate effectively (FRC, 2010a; Higgs-Report, 2003), and 
therefore, it can be expected that board size may have an impact on voluntary CG compliance and 
disclosure practices. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H1. Larger boards tend to engage in greater compliance with, and disclosure of, good CG practices 
than smaller boards. 
4.1.2 Proportion of independent outside directors 
From a neo-institutional (efficiency view) theoretical perspective, the appointment of 
independent outside directors is deemed to be one of the important governance mechanism that can 
facilitate effective monitoring of boards, and thereby help in reducing inherent agency problems 
between executives and shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Similarly, neo-institutional theory 
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(legitimation view) suggests that, the split of ownership from control may lead to increase the lack of 
trust between agents and owners, which may have negative implications for the legitimacy of 
managerial decisions (Adegbite, 2015). However, Ntim & Soobaroyen (2013) suggest that such 
legitimacy concerns can be minimised by appointing independent outside directors, who act as 
representative of different groups of stakeholders. Therefore, the presence of independent outside 
directors may not only enhance efficiency for shareholders by mitigating agency conflicts, but can 
also enhance legitimacy by taking into account the interests of different groups of stakeholder. 
Additionally, independent outside directors tend to bring greater diversity to corporate boards, 
including knowledge, skills and business contacts (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). Thus, the 
appointment of independent outside directors can influence positively the level CG disclosure 
practices by putting greater pressure on corporate executives to be more transparent about their CG 
practices. 
Empirically, the findings of empirical literature largely suggest a positive link among the 
presence of independent outside directors and CG disclosure practices. For instance, and in line with 
the findings of previous studies (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008; Samaha & Dahawy, 2011), Samaha et 
al. (2012) report a positive relationship between the proportions of outside executives and voluntary 
disclosure about CG practices. A limited number of evidence, however, suggest a negative 
relationship between the proportions of outside directors and corporate disclosure behaviour (e.g., 
Al-Moataz & Hussainey, 2014; Barako et al., 2006). With respect to the UK corporate context, 
Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) report that the association between the proportion of outside directors 
and voluntary CG disclosure practices is positive. Additionally, the 2010 UK Combined Code (see 
Section b.1.2) suggests that at least half of corporate board should be independent outside directors. 
This implies that the Combined Code considers the presence of independent outside directors on 
corporate boards to be a good CG aspect, and therefore, can be expected to positively influence CG 
compliance and disclosure practices. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2. Boards with more independent outside directors tend to engage in greater compliance with, and 
disclosure of, good CG practices than those with less independent outside directors. 
4.1.3 Corporate board diversity 
The diversity of corporate board is deemed to be an important components that can influence its 
performance (Carter et al., 2010; Upadhyay & Zeng, 2014). Corporate board diversity can be defined 
using different attributes, such as gender, age, professional background and ethnic origin (Singh & 
Vinnicombe, 2004). Nevertheless, the majority of existing literature focused mainly on gender and 
ethnic diversity aspects of the board, as they are easily observable and thus easier to operationalise 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Adegbite, 2015; Carter et al., 2010; Ntim, 2015; Upadhyay & Zeng, 
2014). Therefore, this study focuses on these two aspects of board’s diversity. From neo-institutional 
(‘efficiency view’)  perspective, the presence of women and ethnic minorities on a firm’s board may 
improve its performance/efficiency (Brammer et al., 2007; Upadhyay & Zeng, 2014), by linking the 
firm to its external environment and that may allow access to crucial resources (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 
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2013). Similarly, and From neo-institutional (‘legitimation view’)  perspective, the presence of 
women and ethnic minorities on a firm’s board may improve its legitimacy by providing better 
networks with influential stakeholders (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). Furthermore, gender and ethnic 
diversity can enhance board independence from management by having members from diverse 
gender and ethnic origins (Barako & Brown, 2008), which can improve the ability of the board to 
effectively monitor self-serving managers from expropriating shareholder wealth (Carter et al., 2010; 
Upadhyay & Zeng, 2014). Thus, and given that the extent of voluntary CG compliance and 
disclosure practices is primarily determined by corporate executives and owners (Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013), it is expected that more diverse boards can put greater pressure on senior 
managers (especially from female and ethnic minority members) to involve in greater compliance 
and disclosure of good CG practices than their less diverse counterparts.  
Empirical studies examining the influence of board diversity on voluntary CG disclosure are 
generally rare (e.g., Barako & Brown, 2008; Brammer et al., 2007; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013), and 
thus offers a good opportunity to contribute to the extant literature. The results of these studies 
suggest that board diversity impacts positively on corporate disclosure practices. Within the 
European corporate context in general, and UK in particular, increasing attention is being paid 
towards improving the governance of large public corporations by encouraging greater involvement 
of women, and Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) groups in top management.  In particular, 
Section b.2 of 2010 UK Combined Code recommends that corporations should ensure that their 
boards are sufficiently diverse in a number of aspects that can impact on their effectiveness, 
including age, experience, skills, gender and ethnicity. Thus, board diversity is viewed as a positive 
CG aspect by the UK Combined Code, which can be expected to impact positively on voluntary CG 
disclosure. Hence, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H3. Boards with more women and ethnic minorities tend to engage in greater compliance with, and 
disclosure of, good CG practices than those with less women and ethnic minorities. 
4.1.4 The Existence of a separate CG committee 
The 2010 UK Combined Code does not require UK listed firms to establish a separate CG 
committee to monitor whether they comply with the requirements of the recommended CG 
provisions contained in it. Consequently, it has been suggested that corporations that voluntarily 
establish a separate CG committee in order to closely monitor their compliance with the CG code are 
expected to involve in good governance practices and thus, voluntarily provide more information 
relating to their CG practices compared with their counterparts that do not have a separate CG 
committee (Ntim et al., 2012b). Therefore, it is predicted that corporations that have a separate CG 
committee to closely monitor their compliance are more likely to involve in good CG practices in 
order to enhance their legitimacy and also gain the support of key stakeholders, to access crucial 
resources, including capital and contacts. 
Empirically, there are few studies that have examined the link among the existence of separate 
CG committees and voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices, and therefore this makes it 
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an interesting area for investigation. Ntim et al. (2012a) find a positive link among the existence of a 
separate CG committees and the voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices for listed 
corporations in South Africa. This study, therefore, expect that corporations that voluntarily establish 
separate CG committees to disclose engage in greater CG compliance and disclosure compared with 
their counterparts with no CG committees. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H4. Boards that set up a separate CG committee tend to engage in greater compliance with, and 
disclosure of good CG practices than those with no separate CG committees. 
4.2. Ownership structure mechanisms  
 
4.2.1 Managerial ownership 
 
From neo-institutional (efficiency view) perspective, managerial ownership can help mitigate 
agency conflicts by aligning management interests with those of shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Similarly, and from a legitimisation perspective, firms with high managerial ownership have 
limited pressure to demonstrate accountability and transparency to outsiders, including the general 
public (Khan et al., 2013). Consequently, firms with high managerial ownership are expected to 
invest less in CG activities because the costs of investing in such activities may exceed the expected 
benefits (Samaha et al., 2012), and therefore a limited need to voluntarily engage in increased 
disclosure of CG practices. 
By contrary, it is argued that higher ownership by managers may not necessarily result in 
aligning management and shareholder interests, because managers may behave opportunistically by 
exploiting insider information to maximise their own benefits at the expense of other shareholders 
(Chen & Al-Najjar, 2012; McConnell & Servaes, 1990). Thus, as ownership by managers increases, 
there is a greater possibility that their monitoring will decrease, which may impact negatively on 
voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices.  
The findings of prior empirical studies support the argument that directors who own substantial 
portion of their firms’ shares impact negatively on the level of voluntary disclosures (e.g., Khan et 
al., 2013). With respect to the UK context, prior empirical studies report that corporations with 
higher managerial ownership tend to disclose less information relating to their CG practices than 
their counterparts with lower managerial ownership (Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012). This leads us to 
propose the following hypothesis: 
H5. Firms with lower managerial ownership tend to engage in greater compliance with, and 
disclosure of, good CG practices than those with higher managerial ownership. 
4.2.2 Institutional ownership  
It is suggested that institutional shareholder actively engage in promoting the fast diffusion of 
codes of good CG practices worldwide (Ntim et al., 2012b). From a neo-institutional (efficiency 
view) perspective, institutional shareholders play an active role in reducing  agency conflicts in 
public corporations (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). One reason is that institutional shareholders tend to 
have relatively higher ownership stakes than individual shareholders and therefore they inherently 
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have more incentives to monitor more closely managerial opportunistic behaviour than their smaller 
counterparts (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Additionally, neo-institutional (legitimation view) theory 
suggests that, institutional shareholders who have significant stakes in public corporations enjoy 
several advantages over small shareholders, including financial, information gathering and 
processing, knowledge, skills and expertise advantages (Ciampi, 2015). Thus,  as powerful corporate 
stakeholders, institutional shareholders can exert more influence on a number of corporate decisions, 
including decisions on appointing directors and disclosure practices (Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012). 
Therefore, the presence of institutional shareholders can impact positively on the voluntary CG 
compliance and disclosure practices. 
Empirically, majority of prior studies report that corporations with higher institutional 
ownership tend to disclose more information relating to their CG practices than their counterparts 
with lower institutional ownership (e.g., Ntim et al., 2012b; Samaha et al. 2012). Nevertheless, few 
studies have also report no association between institutional ownership and the level of voluntary 
disclosures (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008). Within the UK corporate context, the findings of 
Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012) and Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) suggest that institutional 
shareholders is related positively to the voluntary CG disclosure. Similarly, 2010 Stewardship Code 
and 2010 UK Combined Code explicitly encourage institutional investors to actively engage in 
enhancing compliance with, and disclosure of, good CG practices among UK listed firms. This leads 
us to propose the following hypothesis: 
H6. Firms with higher institutional ownership tend to engage in greater compliance with, and 
disclosure of, good CG practices than those with lower institutional ownership. 
4.2.3 Block ownership 
From neo-institutional (efficiency view) perspective, corporations with concentrated ownership 
are less likely to comply with good CG standards (Chen & Al-Najjar, 2012; Patel et al., 2002), 
because block-holders tend to have unrestricted access to insider information directly from managers 
rather than through corporate disclosure media, such as annual reports (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). 
Concentrated ownership is, therefore, associated with less information asymmetry, which can 
mitigate agency problems (Reverte, 2009), and thus a reduced need for voluntary CG disclosures. In 
essence, block ownership can effectively serve as an alternative mechanism for good CG, including 
voluntary CG disclosure practices (Bozec & Bozec, 2007). Similarly, neo-institutional theory from a 
legitimisation perspective indicates that firms with concentrated ownership tend to have less external 
pressure to demonstrate public accountability (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Samaha et al., 2012), 
which can impact negatively on the level of voluntary CG disclosures. By contrast, greater 
information asymmetry and agency problems often associated with disperse ownership can be 
addressed by managerial commitment to engage in increased disclosure, including disclosing more 
information relating to their CG practices (Melis et al., 2015; Reverte, 2009). Thus, the theoretical 
expectation is that corporations with concentrated ownership structures are more likely disclose 
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information relating to their CG practices compared with their counterparts with dispersed 
ownership. 
Empirically, the existing empirical evidence is largely consistent with the prediction that 
ownership concentration impacts negatively on voluntary CG disclosures. For instance, and 
consistent with the evidence provided by previous literature (Bozec & Bozec, 2007; Samaha & 
Dahawy, 2011), Samaha et al. (2012) find that higher ownership concentration is associated 
negatively with the disclosure of CG information among Egyptian listed firms. With reference to the 
UK corporate context, the findings Melis et al. (2015) indicate that ownership concentration impacts 
negatively on voluntary CG disclosure practices. Hence, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H7. Firms with high block ownership tend to engage in less compliance with, and disclosure of, 
good CG practices than those with less block ownership. 
5.  Research Design 
 
5.1. Data collection procedure 
 
In order to investigate the voluntary CG compliance and disclosure among UK listed 
corporations, and consequently determine whether board characteristics and ownership structure 
variables can explain observable differences in in the extent to which the UK listed firms voluntarily 
engage in greater compliance with, and disclosure of, good CG practices, all non-financial listed 
corporations on the main market of LSE for years 2008-2013 were sampled. Since firm size and 
industry type (Cooke, 1992) are expected to affect CG compliance and disclosure practices, the 
selection of our final sample took into account firm size and industry distributions. There were a total 
of 612 non-financial listed firms2 on the LSE as at the end of 31 December 2013. Listed firms have 
to meet three main specifications in order to be included to the study’s final sample: (i) the annual 
reports of the listed corporations need to be available for the years from 2008 to 2013; (ii) a firm’s 
financial and market performance data have to be available for all six years investigated; and (iv) the 
firm has to maintain continuous listing over the six years investigated.  
The above three specifications were used for these reasons. First, consistent with prior literature 
(Ntim et al., 2012a, b), these specifications allowed conforming to the conditions of balanced panel 
data analysis. There are several benefits from using balanced panel data, including increasing 
degrees of freedom and reducing collinearity problem (Wooldridge, 2013). Second, combining time-
                                               
      2  First and in line with previous studies (Melis et al., 2015; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013), financials and utilities (685 corporations) are 
excluded in our sample for this study for two main reasons: (i) they have different capital structure; and (ii) they are subject to different 
regulations (Guest, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012a, b), which can impact differently on the level of their voluntary CG disclosures. Second, 319 
corporations with missing annual reports/data/listed recently were also excluded, leaving us with 293 firms with full data. The 
classification of the remaining 293 corporations is as follows: basic-material consists of 27 (9%) corporations; consumer-goods consist of 
36 (13%) corporations; consumer-service consists of 68 (23%) corporations; healthcare consists of 15 (5%) corporations; industrial 
consists of 102 (35%) corporations; oil & gas consist of 18 (6%) corporations; technology consist of 22 (7%) corporations; and 
telecommunication consist of 5 (2%) corporations. Third, because the number of observations from healthcare, oil & gas, and 
telecommunication industries was relatively small, the observations from these three industries were added to basic-material, consumer-
services, and technology industries. In particular, corporations operating oil & gas industry were included in basic-material industry, 
corporations operating in healthcare industry were added to consumer-services industry, while corporations operating in the 
telecommunication industry were added to the technology industry. Finally, due to that collecting data manually from corporations’ annual 
reports is considered to be a tedious work coupled with the extensive nature of the CG disclosure, ownership and board structures, and 
financial data required, a final balanced sample of 100 firms from 2008 to 2013 (i.e., resulting in a sample of 600 company-year 
observations) were stratifiedly sampled using both firm size and industry type. Specifically, the largest 10 corporations and the smallest 10 
corporations were selected (i.e. 20 corporations from each of the main 5 industries) using market capitalisation. 
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series and cross-section data can allow ascertaining if the observable cross-sectional relationship 
among voluntary CG compliance/disclosure, board and ownership mechanisms also remains the 
same over time. Third, the sampling period starts in 2008, because the 2007/2008 financial crisis has 
increased debate surrounding the effectiveness of CG and disclosure practices and thus, the current 
study may offer insights on the extent to which the recent financial crisis has affected CG structures 
and disclosure practices among UK listed corporations. The sampling period ends in 2013 because it 
was the latest year for which the annual reports of listed corporations were published when the data 
collection started. Data relating to board characteristics, ownership structure variables and voluntary 
CG compliance and disclosure practices were collected manually from the annual reports of the 
examined sample. Those reports were downloaded from corporations’ websites and Perfect 
Information, whereas the DataStream was used to collect the financial data. 
5.2. Variables measurement and regression model 
 
Table 2 summarises all variables used in conducting the empirical analyses of current study. 
First, and as presented in Table 2, our main dependent variable is a broad UK CG index (UKCGI), 
which contains 120 CG provisions covering five sections of the 2010 UK Combined Code: (i) board 
leadership (LSH); (ii) board effectiveness (ETIV); (iii) board accountability (ACNT); executive pay 
(REM); and (iv) relations with shareholders (RWS). We constructed our UKCGI by given “1” if any 
of the 120 CG provisions included in the UKCGI is disclosed and “0” otherwise.3 Following this 
widely employed binary coding scheme, a firm’s total disclosure score in a certain company-year 
may range between 0 and 120, which is expressed as a percentage ranging from 0% (perfect non-
compliance and disclosure) to 100% (perfect compliance and disclosure) with higher index scoring 
suggesting better CG compliance and disclosure practices.4 
We adopted an un-weighted coding scheme for several reasons. First, unlike the weighted 
coding scheme, this approach enables us to avoid making judgement to assign a particular provision 
because it assumes that all provisions are equally important (Botosan, 1997). This suggests that the 
un-weighted coding scheme enables us to avoid a situation where the same provision could be 
weighted differently by different user groups (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Second, there is no agreed 
theoretical background on the weight that should be assigned to different CG provisions, and thus 
our decision to use the un-weighted coding scheme avoids making a bias judgment towards one or a 
                                               
      3  For brevity, we do not provide the full list of 120 CG provisions examined, but will be made easily available on request. Specifically, 
the constructed UKCGI contains CG provisions from each of the 5 sub-indices, including 8, 37, 36, 22 and 17 CG provisions relating to 
board leadership, board effectiveness, board accountability, executive pay and relations with shareholders, respectively. For example: 
leadership (i.e., whether the chairperson is also the CEO “0” or not “1”); ‘effectiveness’ (i.e., whether the chairperson is either independent 
“1” or not “0”); ‘accountability’ (i.e., whether a firm has a risk management committee “1” or not “0”); ‘remuneration’ (i.e., whether 
disclosure is made about the remuneration policy “1” or not “0”); and ‘relations with shareholders’ (i.e., whether a board’s members attend 
annual general meetings “1” or not “0”). 
      4  The content analysis for this study was performed by a single coder. However, to make sure that the reliability, validity and 
consistency of coding, in the first round of coding, a primary sample of 10 corporations (2 corporations from each of the main five 
industries) over the period 2008-2013 was coded. Coding categories and coded materials were critically discussed with two experienced 
coders and then in the second round any mistakes or inconsistencies identified independently by the two coders in the first round, were 
discussed and corrected. A further 10 firms were coded, but the two experienced coders independently did not identify any mistakes or 
inconsistencies with the coding procedure. This ensured near perfect correlation between the first and second stage coding and thus, high 
levels of consistency, reliability, and validity were achieved. 
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set of CG provisions as it is often the case with the use of weighted coding scheme (Barako et al., 
2006). Third, the evidence provided by previous literature indicates that both weighted and un-
weighted coding schemes lead to similar results, especially in cases, where the number of disclosure 
items is large (Barako et al., 2006). This is empirically supported in our study (i.e., Model 1 of Table 
7), as we find that both schemes (i.e., using weighted or un-weighted index) lead to similar results. 
Finally, the use of binary scoring scheme is based on a rigorously developed theoretical and 
empirical literature (e.g., Barako et al. 2006; Collett & Hrasky, 2005; Khan et al. 2013; Ntim et al., 
2012 a, b; Samaha et al. 2012), and therefore this can facilitate comparisons with those studies5.  
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Second, board and ownership mechanisms are our main independent variables. Board 
mechanisms, include corporate board size (BSE), the proportion of independent outside directors 
(IOE), board gender diversity (BDG), board ethnic diversity (BDE), board diversity based on both 
gender and ethnicity (BD), and the existence of a separate CG committee (PCGC), whereas 
ownership mechanisms include managerial ownership (MANO), institutional ownership (ISTO), and 
block ownership (BLKO). Finally, and in order to account for omitted variables bias, the study 
controls for several variables, including firm size (LTA), firm age (LAG),  capital expenditure 
(CEX), sales growth (SG), gearing (GR), profitability (Q), industry (IDU) and year variables (YDU). 
For brevity purposes, this study has not developed specific hypotheses among each of the control 
variables and the UKCGI, however there is a well-established evidence, which indicates that these 
variables can impact on voluntary CG disclosures (Cooke, 1992; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Ntim et 
al., 2012b). Based on the above seven hypotheses, the following model is proposed and with the aim 
to be tested using the ordinary least square (OLS). 

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Where UKCGI is the UK CG compliance and disclosure index; BSE is board size; IOE is the 
proportion of independent outside directors; BD refers to board diversity based on both gender and 
ethnicity; PCGC is the existence of a separate CG committee; MANO refers to managerial 
ownership; ISTO is defined as institutional ownership; BLKO is block ownership; and CONTS 
points out to the set of variables being controlled, namely firm size (LTA), firm age (LAG),  capital 
expenditure (CEX), sales growth (SG), gearing (GR), profitability (Q), five industry dummies (IDU), 
and six year dummies (YDU). 
 
                                               
     5  The current study used Cronbach’s alpha to examine the internal consistency of the constructed index. The Cronbach’s alpha value 
for the five categories in the UKCGI is 0.88 indicating that the compliance and disclosure index employed in this study is a reliable 
measure of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices (Allegrini & Greco, 2013). 
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6. Empirical Findings 
 
6.1. Descriptive analysis and bivariate correlations 
Panel ‘A’ of Table 3 reports the descriptive analysis of data relating to the level of compliance 
with CG practices and its 5 sub-indices over the 6 years investigated (2008-2013). Crucially, the 
distribution of the UKCGI varies substantially, ranging from 20% (24 out from 120 provisions 
disclosed) to 94.17% (113 out from 120) with the mean (median) corporation complying with 
61.73% (64.58%) of the 120 CG provisions investigated. Similarly, the distribution of the 5 
UKCGI’s sub-indices differs substantially. For example, the board leadership sub-index (LSH) 
ranges between 12.50% and 100%, with the average corporation complying with 79.35% of the 8 
CG provisions examined. With respect to the other sub-indices of the UKCGI, overall the levels of 
CG compliance and disclosure practices among the UK investigated corporations vary substantially, 
implying that differences exist between the level of compliance and disclosure with the summary 
UKCGI and its 5 sub-indices. In general, it can be observed that in spite of the expectation that the 
development of the UK Combined Code will speed-up the adoption of good CG standards, there is 
still substantial variation in the governance practices among the UK publicly listed corporations. 
Although, this is in line with the evidence provided by previous studies (Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 
2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Melis et al., 2015), it indicates that there is a substantial degree of 
variation regarding the importance that UK listed firms attach to compliance and disclosure of good 
governance practices. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Further, Panels ‘D’ & ‘E’ of Table 3 present the descriptive analysis for all other variables. 
Overall, both Panels show wide variations for all the variables under examination. For example, 
board size (BSE) is between 3 and 18 with a median of 8 board members. Additionally, and similar 
to the findings of prior studies (Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Veprauskaitė & Adams, 2013), 
institutional ownership (ISTO)  and block ownership (BLKO) range from 3.07% to of 97.49%, 
98.08% with a mean of 36.38% and 43.20% respectively. Board diversity (BD) based on both gender 
and ethnicity ranges between 0% and 50% with an average of 11.65%, suggesting that the average 
UK listed corporation’s board is dominated by white males. Board ethnic diversity (BDE) is, 
observably, low ranging from 0%, to 25% with a median (mean) of 0% (1.37%). Evidence of low 
ethnic and gender diversity in UK boardrooms are largely consistent with those provided of prior UK 
empirical studies (Brammer et al., 2007; Singh &Vinnicombe, 2004).With reference to the remaining 
variables, including the proportion of independent outside directors (IOE), board gender diversity 
(BDG), managerial ownership (MANO), the existence of a separate CG committee (PCGC), and the 
control variables, the findings suggest that there is adequate variation in them. Thus, our findings 
suggest that our sample has been carefully chosen and thereby minimising any possibilities of 
sample selection bias.  
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To make further informative inferences about our data, the sample is divided into two groups: 
(i) corporations with high CG ranking (corporations having a UKCGI score higher than the 
mean/median value); and (ii) corporations with low CG ranking (corporations having a UKCGI score 
lower than the mean/median value). The results of the t test comparing the ‘mean’ and ‘median’ 
differences for the board/ownership and control variables are presented in Table 3 under columns 7 
& 8. Overall, the findings suggest that there is a substantial variation in terms of the mean and 
median between the two groups. For instance, the mean is significantly different between 
corporations with high CG scores and those with low CG scores as follows: the presence of 
independent outside directors (17.12); board gender diversity (3.66); Board gender and ethnicity 
diversity (4.22); the existence of a separate CG committee (7.70); managerial ownership (-9.40); 
institutional ownership (-8.14); and block ownership (-17.81). The results imply that corporations 
with larger boards, more independent outside directors, more diverse boards, and which have a 
separate CG committee engage in greater compliance with, and disclosure of, CG practices. By 
contrary, corporations with concentrated ownership and high managerial and institutional ownership 
commit to low CG disclosures.  
Table 4 reports the results of correlation matrices for all variables used in this study in order to 
examine the presence of multicollinearities among the variables. The coefficients of both Pearson’s 
and Spearman’s are provided as a robustness check and, noticeably, the direction and the magnitude 
of coefficients reported in both correlation matrices are fairly the same, indicating non-existence of 
serious non-normality problems. Further, the coefficients of both correlation matrices suggest that 
the levels of correlation among variables used in the current study are relatively weak, indicating 
non-existence of serious multicollinearity problems. Additionally, the values of Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF), which is reported in Table 5, do not exceed 10, indicating that there is no serious 
multicollinearity problems (Field, 2009). We also examine the presence of heteroscedasticity in our 
model using Breusch-Pagan test and the p-value is 0.1779, indicating that heteroscedasticity is not 
present in our model.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Overall, and as hypothesised, Table 4 suggests statistically significant association among the 
UKCGI and all other variables. In line with our predictions, board size (BSE), the proportion of 
independent outside directors (IOE), board diversity based on gender and ethnicity (BD), and the 
existence of a separate CG committee (PCGC) are positively associated with the UKCGI, whereas 
managerial (MANO) and block ownership (BLKO) are significantly and negatively associated with 
the UKCGI. However, the results suggest that corporations with higher institutional ownership 
(ISTO) tend to provide significantly less CG information, which is not in line with our hypothesis.  
In terms of the control variables, the evidence suggests that larger (LTA), older (LAG), profitable 
(Q), capital intensive (CEX) and highly geared (GR) corporations disclose more CG information 
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voluntarily, as hypothesised. However, the evidence that sales’ growth (SG) has no significant 
association with CG compliance and disclosure practices is not consistent with our hypothesis. 
6.2. Regression analysis 
Table 5 presents the findings relating the antecedents of CG compliance and disclosure 
practices. Models 1, 2 and 3 report the findings of the OLS analysis of board characteristics and 
ownership structure variables without the control variables on the UKCGI. In Models 4 and 5 board 
characteristics and ownership mechanisms are regressed on the UKCGI by including control 
variables, respectively. Observably, the results reported in Model 6 generally indicate that the 
explanatory variables are significant in explaining cross-sectional differences in the levels of 
voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices (UKCGI).  
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
With respect to board characteristics; first, board size (BSE) is positively and significantly 
linked to the UKCGI (0.095), thereby providing empirical support for H1. This is also consistent 
with the findings of Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) and Ntim et al. (2012, a, b). The evidence is also in 
line with the expectations of neo-institutional (legitimation view) perspective, which suggest that 
larger boards are characterised by increasing stakeholder representation, and that can increase the 
need for voluntary disclosures in order to facilitate the attraction of crucial resources from powerful 
stakeholders. Additionally, neo-institutional (efficiency view) perspective suggests that larger boards 
are usually associated with greater monitoring on management activities, and that can impact 
positively on voluntary CG disclosure practices. 
Second, the proportion of independent outside directors (IOE) is significantly and positively 
associated with the UKCGI (0.198); therefore H2  is empirically supported. This indicates that 
boards with more independent outside directors tend to disclose more information relating to their 
CG practices than those with less independent outside directors. Additionally, the positive and 
significant association between the proportitions of outside directors and voluntary CG compliance 
and disclosure practices provides empirical support to the findings of prior studies (Donnelly & 
Mulcahy, 2008; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Samaha et al., 2012). Theoretically (‘efficiency and 
legitimation views’), the appointment of independent directors can impact positively on voluntary 
CG disclosures by ehancing corporate legitimacy and mitigating agency conflicts through incrased 
managerial monitoring. 
Third, board gender and ethnicity diversity (BD) is significantly and positively associated with 
the UKCGI (0.117), and thus H3 is supported. Empirically, the our finding is consistent with that of 
Barako and Brown (2008) who report a significant positive link among board diversity and CG 
disclosure practices. The evidence is also in line with the predictions of neo-institutional (‘efficiency 
and legitimation views’) perspective, which proposes that diversified boards (i.e., have more women 
and ethnic monitories) may place more pressure on corporate executives to involve in good 
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governance practices in order to ehance corporate legitimacy, attract resources from powerful 
stakeholders and also improve the capability of corporate board to  monitor management activities 
more effectively, and thereby can impact positively on voluntary CG disclosure practices.    
Finally, the existence of a separate CG committee (PCGC) is found to have a positive, but 
insignificant association with the UKCGI (0.015), implying that H4 is not emperically supported. 
The evidence is also not consistent with the expectations of neo-institutional theory (‘legitimation 
view’), which suggests that corporations that voluntarily set up a separate CG committees to closely 
monitor their compliance with governance rules and regulations are more likely to comply with good 
CG standards in order to improve their legitimacy and also obtain key stakeholders’ support to gain 
access crucial resources. Empirically, the positive and insignificant association between PCGC and 
the UKCGI does not provide support for the results of Ntim et al. (2012b). However, the 
insignificant link among the PCGC and voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices is not 
surprising, because only 8% of the sampled firms have a separate CG committee; this result in small 
cross-sectional variations of the PCGC among the examined firms. 
With respect to ownership structure variables, the findings in Table 5 suggest that the ownership 
structure variables have mixed influence in explaining cross-sectional differences in the voluntary 
CG compliance and disclosure practices. Specifically, managerial ownership (MANO) is 
significantly and negatively associated with the UKCGI (-0.277), and thereby providing empirical 
support for H5. Similarly, block ownership (BLKO) is found to impact negatively on the UKCGI (-
0.245) and thus H7 is empirically supported. These findings are consistent with the predictions of 
neo-institutional theory (‘efficiency view’), which suggests that corporations with increased 
managerial ownership and block ownership are associated with less information asymmetry and 
agency problems, which can impact negatively on voluntary CG disclosure practices (Bozec & 
Bozec, 2007). Neo-institutional theory (‘legitimation view’) also suggests that, firms with 
concentrated ownership tend to have less external pressure to demonstrate public accountability 
(Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Samaha et al., 2012), which can impact negatively on voluntary CG 
disclosures. Empirically, the negative association among managerial ownership (MANO), block 
ownership (BLKO), and the UKCGI provides support for similar findings of Bozec and Boze (2007), 
Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012), Ntim et al. (2012 a, b) and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013). 
Institutional ownership (ISTO) is found to have a positive, but insignificant influence on the 
UKCGI (0.045); thus H6 is not empirically supported. Theoretically, the insignificant impact of 
institutional ownership on the UKCGI does not support the predictions of neo-institutional theory 
(‘legitimation view), which indicates that corporations with higher institutional owneership have a 
greater need to demonstrate public accountability and transparency so as to legitimise their 
operations as well as gain access to critical resources. Empirically, the insignificant association 
between institutional ownership and the UKCGI is not consistent with the findings of Hussainey and 
Al-Najjar (2012), Barako et al. (2006), Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012), and Ntim et al. (2012b), who 
provide empirical evidence that institutional ownership is associated positively with corporate  
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voluntary disclosures. However, the insignificant impact of institutional ownership may due to that 
institutional investors are passive and ineffective in monitoring (Dong & Ozkan, 2008). 
In terms of control variables, the coefficients on them in Model 6 of Table 5 generally 
significant, for example, capital expenditure (CEX) and gearing (GR) are significantly and positively 
associated with voluntary CG compliance and disclosure practices, providing empirical support to 
the results of Meek et al. (1995) and Ntim et al., (2012b). Discernibly, other control variables, 
including sales growth (SG) and profitability (Q) have insignificant relationship with voluntary CG 
compliance and disclosure practices. Our findings are consistent with the results of prior studies, 
which find no association between these two variables and voluntary CG disclosures (Mallin & Ow-
Yong, 2012). The negative and significant coefficient on firm size (LTA) empirically support the 
results of Melis et al. (2015) and Waweru (2014) who report a negative association between firm size 
and voluntary CG disclosure. Finally, the negative and insignificant coefficient on firm age (LAG) is 
inconsistent with the findings of Haque et al., (2011), who report a positive and significant 
relationship between firm age and voluntary disclosure practices. 
Generally, the findings of this study indicate that board characteristics and ownership 
mechanisms impact significantly on voluntary CG disclosure practices. However, in Model 6 we 
measured board diversity based only on the overall proportion of women and ethnic minorities on a 
corporate board. Therefore, it is possible that the association between board diversity and the 
UKCGI may differ if we re-estimate Model 6 by replacing board diversity based on gender and 
ethnicity with board gender (BDG) and board ethnicity (BDE), separately. As shown in Model 1 of 
Table 6, board gender diversity is found to impact positively on the UKCGI supporting the view that 
boards of diverse gender tend to put greater pressure of top management to engage in greater 
compliance and disclosure of CG practices in order enhance board’s ability to monitor utility 
managers effectively (Carter et al., 2010). Additionally, the evidence contained in Model 1 of Table 
6 shows that board ethnic diversity (BDE) is negatively associated with the UKCGI. Evidence of 
negative influence of BDE in the UK boardroom is largely consistent with their extremely low 
representation (1.37%, see Table 3) and this suggest that ethnic minorities have less influence over 
their boards’ decisions, including CG disclosure (Carter et al., 2010; Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 
2015) 
Insert Table 6 about here 
Our results indicate that the observed differences in our UKCGI can be justified by our board 
and ownership variables. However, the UKCGI consists of five sub-indices, including leadership 
(LSH), effectiveness (ETIV), accountability (ACNT), remuneration (REM) and relations with 
shareholders (RWS). Therefore, it is possible for the relationship between the board/ownership 
characteristics and the individual sub-indices to differ from that of the main UKCGI.  We, therefore, 
re-estimate Model 6 by replacing the UKCGI with the five sub-indices and the findings are provided 
in models 2 to 6 in Table 6.  
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The coefficients on board size, the proportion of independent outside directors, board gender 
and ethnic diversity, and the existence of a separate CG committee (with exception of RWS sub-
index) remain positively associated with the five sub-indices. Similarly, the coefficient on 
institutional ownership (with exception of LSH and REM sub-indices) remains positively associated 
with the rest three sub-indices. In contrast, the coefficient on managerial ownership (MANO) and 
block ownership (BLKO) remain significantly and negatively associated with the five sub-indices. 
Overall, the results provided in Models 2 to 6 of Table 6 offer further empirical support for the 
findings presented in Models 6 of Table 5. 
6.3. Further analyses 
To examine the robustness of the obtained findings, additional tests have been carried out. As 
have been explained, all 120 CG provision included in the UKCGI are equally weighted. However, 
because the number of CG provisions included in each of the five sub-indices differs, this lead to 
assigning different weights to our five sub-index: leadership (i.e., 8 CG provisions); effectiveness 
(i.e., 37 CG provisions); accountability (i.e., 36 CG provisions); executive pay (i.e., 22 CG 
provisions); and relations with shareholder (i.e., 17 CG provisions). Therefore, to ensure that our 
findings are not sensitive to the weight being assigned to the 5 sub-index, an alternative index, 
named “W-UKCGI” has been constructed in which each of the 5 sub-indices is awarded equal 
weight of 20%. The results for the weighted UKCGI are presented in Model 1 of Table 7. 
Observably, the findings stay almost the same as the results provided in model 6 of Table 5, and thus 
indicating that our results appear to be robust to whether a weighted or un-weighted CG disclosure 
index is used. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
Additionally, a number of previous studies suggest that some of corporate board characteristics 
(e.g., board size) and ownership structure variables (e.g., managerial, institutional and block 
ownership) have non-linear relationship with corporate voluntary disclosures (Sun et al., 2015; 
Guest, 2009; Morck et al., 1988). To identify the existence of non-linear relationship between board 
size, managerial, institutional, block ownership and the UKCGI, Model 6 in Table 5 has been re-
estimated by adding the square root of board size, managerial, institutional and block ownership. The 
findings are reported in Model 2 of Table 7. With respect of board size, Model 2 exhibits that larger 
boards have a negative and significant relationship with the voluntary CG disclosure, indicating that 
there is a curvilinear relationship among board size and voluntary CG compliance and disclosure 
practices. This evidence also supports the findings of Guest (2009), who reported similar non-linear 
evidence. 
Our findings presented in Models 2 of Table 7 relating to the ownership variables generally 
suggest the existence of non-linear associations between them and the UKCGI. For example, and 
with respect to managerial ownership, the evidence suggests that management becomes less 
  
25 
 
entrenched at higher levels of ownerships, but becomes more entrenched as ownership of 
management decreases. This result is consistent with the findings of Morck et al. (1988) who find 
that higher ownership by managers help to align their interests with those of owners and that 
improves corporate performance. 
Similarly, and with respect to institutional ownership, the evidence suggests that there is non-
linear relationship between institutional ownership and CG compliance and disclosure practices. 
additionally, the evidence contained in Model 2 of Table 7 suggests that block owners become more 
entrenched at higher levels of ownership, which is consistent with theoretical suggestions that 
concentrated ownership is associated with less  information asymmetry, which can  ultimately lead to 
a reduction in agency problems (Reverte, 2009), and thereby minimising the demand of providing 
more transparent information (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). 
In addition to the above robustness tests and in order to address potential endogeneity concerns 
that might emerge from simultaneous relationship among board characteristics, ownership structure 
variables and voluntary CG disclosure practices, a lagged structure model has been estimated, 
whereby the current year CG disclosure practices depend on the previous year’s board and 
ownership mechanisms. The results reported in model 3 of Table 7 stay almost the same as the 
results provided previously in Model 6 of Table 5, suggesting that the findings are fairly robust to 
possible endogeneity issues that might emerge from simultaneous relationship among board 
characteristics, ownership structure variables and voluntary CG disclosures. 
Additionally, CG mechanism and disclosures are generally ‘sticky’ over-time, and thus simply 
estimating a lagged structure may not be able to fully address the presence of any potential 
endogeneities. Therefore and to address the possible endogeneity concerns that may emerge from 
omitted variable bias, Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) model has been estimated. Following Beiner 
et al. (2006), a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (DWH) has been conducted to examine whether an 
endogenous relationship between the UKCGI and board/ownership mechanisms exists. Applying 
Durbin-Wu test to Model 6 of Table 5, the test indicates the existence of endogeneity problems, and 
thereby implying that 2SLS regression analysis may be more suitable compared to the OLS 
approach. Therefore, and in line with prior literature (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2013), in 
the first stage, we conjectured that the CG mechanisms (i.e. board and ownership characteristics) are 
influenced by the eight control variables. In the second stage, the predicted values of the board and 
ownership characteristics are employed as instruments and re-estimated Model 6 of Table 5.  
Overall, the findings reported in model 4 of Table 7 remain essentially the same as those contained 
in model 6 of Table 5, and thus indicating that the findings appear to be robust to possible 
endogeneity issue that might emerge from omitted variable bias. 
Finally, fixed-effect model has been estimated address possible firm-level heterogeneity. This 
model has been estimated because it has been suggested that there may be other unobserved firm-
specific factors, which can impact on voluntary CG disclosure practices that our OLS approach may 
be unable to determine (Ntim et al., 2012a; Upadhyay & Zeng, 2014). To control for unobserved 
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firm-level characteristics, Model 6 of Table 5 has been re-estimated by including 99 dummies to 
represent 100 sampled firms. The findings shown in Model 5 of Table 7 remain generally the same, 
indicating that the findings of the study are fairly robust to the presence of any possible endogeneity 
issues that may emerge firm-specific heterogeneity. 
7. Conclusions 
Although several of previous studies have link the association among CG mechanisms and 
general voluntary disclosure practices over the past decades, studies examining how and to what 
extent board and ownership mechanisms impact on the level of compliance with, and disclosure of, 
CG practices included in the influential 2010 UK Combined Code are rare. Therefore, this paper 
investigates voluntary CG compliance and disclosure among firms listed in UK, and consequently 
examines whether the ownership and board characteristics can explain observable differences CG 
practices, with specific focus on the period following the 2007/08 global financial crisis.  
In addition to proposing and applying a neo-institutional theoretical view to investigate the 
antecedents of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure, our results extend, as well as contribute to 
the extant studies by using one of the most extensive data-to-date on CG disclosures constituting 120 
CG provisions extracted from the 2010 UK Combined Code, the study provide new evidence, which 
indicates that the CG practices vary substantially among the sampled firms. This implies that there is 
a substantial degree of variation among UK listed firms in relation to the importance that they 
attached to good CG practices. 
The findings indicate that the level CG disclosure is high in corporations that have larger boards, 
more independent directors and more diversified boards, but low in corporations that have higher 
managerial ownership and block ownership. By contrary, the study finds no association between the 
existence of a separate CG committee, institutional ownership and voluntary CG compliance and 
disclosure practices. Overall, the results are generally in line with the efficiency and legitimation 
implications of our neo-institutional theoretical framework. The results are also generally the same 
across a number of econometric models that address different endogeneity concerns and alternative 
CG disclosure indices. 
The findings of the study have a number of policy implications and suggest some 
recommendations for policy-makers, regulatory authorities and other countries. First, the findings of 
the study indicate the level of CG compliance and disclosure varies substantially among the UK 
listed firms. This provides UK policy-makers and regulatory authorities (e.g., LSE & FRC) with a 
strong motivation to find ways to strengthen enforcement further. One way to enhance CG 
compliance and disclosure is by establishing a compliance and enforcement committee. Further, 
more effective cooperation and coordination among the key regulatory and enforcement bodies can 
enhance legal enforcement, which in turn, can improve CG compliance and disclosure behaviour 
among listed firms. Second, UK firms with more women on their boards have higher levels of CG 
compliance and disclosure than those with less women on their boards (i.e., See Model 1 of Table 6), 
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suggesting that women have strong motivation to actively monitor CG standards, which in turn, 
seems to enhance CG practices within firms. This implies that the recommendations of 
?????????????????????? 2010?? Which date?????????????????????????? Davies Report for more 
women on UK boards may be considered as positive CG development. However, we also find that 
firm-level voluntary CG disclosure is lower in firms with more ethnic minorities on their boards, 
which does not lend support to the prediction that board ethnic diversity increases board 
independence and effectiveness. The negative effect of ethnic minorities on voluntary CG 
compliance and disclosure may due to their extremely low representation (i.e. 1.37%, see Table 3), 
as many of the sampled firms have few non-white directors on their boards. This may encourage UK 
policy-makers and regulatory authorities to introduce new CG provisions which may promote the 
participation of non-white directors in UK boardrooms. Third, we find a statistically insignificant 
relationship between firm-level CG compliance and disclosure and institutional ownership. The 
insignificant effect of institutional shareholders indicates that institutional investors are not efficient 
in monitoring (Dong & Ozkan, 2008). Therefore, UK policy-makers and regulatory authorities may 
be encouraged to introduce new legislation that increases shareholder activism, particularly by 
institutional shareholders, to require listed firms to provide additional information on CG compliance 
Finally, our results may be relevant to other countries, since UK CG practices are suggested to have 
a significant influence on the development of CG codes of many countries around the world, thus, 
the findings of this paper can be generalised to other countries. 
While the results of this study are robust and important, this study has a number of limitations 
that suggest a need for more research. First, this study employs un-weighted coding scheme, which 
regards all CG provisions included in the index to have equal importance, which may not be the case 
both in theory and practice. However, the use of un-weighted coding scheme is justified as follows: 
(i) the use of un-weighted coding avoids subjectivity in assigning weights to the disclosed items 
(Botosan, 1997); (ii) there is no agreed theoretical basis for assigning weights to different CG 
provisions (Barako et al., 2006); (iii) evidence from prior studies suggests that both weighted and un-
weighted CG indices are similar in terms of results (Barako et al., 2006); and (iv) the binary scoring 
is adopted in our study to facilitate comparison with the results of past studies (e.g., Barako et al. 
2006; Collett & Hrasky, 2005; Khan et al. 2013; Ntim et al., 2012 a, b; Samaha et al. 2012). Second, 
although our study relies mainly on annual reports to collect required data, using other sources of 
information, such as analyst reports and face-to-face interviews could assist in obtaining more 
detailed data. However, we use firms’ annual reports because they are considered to be the most 
regular and reliable sources of information about CG (Botosan, 1997). Additionally, we use only 
annual reports in order to be consistent and to facilitate comparison with the results of prior studies 
(e.g. Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Ntim, 2015; Padgett & Shabbir, 2005). Third, due to data limitations, 
the investigation in this study is limited to internal CG mechanisms that potential influence voluntary 
CG compliance and disclosure practices. As explained below, future studies may include both 
  
28 
 
external and internal CG mechanisms. Finally, endogeneity problems cannot be completely 
eliminated. However, this study follows existing literature (e.g. Beiner et al., 2006; Core et al., 2015; 
Gippel et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2012 a, b; Schultz et al., 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012) by adopting 
different estimation methods to control for potential endogeneity problems, including estimating two 
stage least squares, fixed-effects and lagged structures.  
The evidence provided in this paper offers potential theoretical and empirical insights for future 
studies.  In terms of theoretical expansions, the evidence indicates that future studies can possibly 
enhance their theoretical grounds by relying on the insights provided by other closely related 
governance theories, including neo-institutional, public accountability and stewardship theories, 
when examining factors, which can influence CG compliance and disclosure practices. With respect 
to empirical insights and given the focus of this paper on the UK, the evidence offers potential 
avenues for future studies that can investigate the antecedents of CG compliance and disclosure in 
different international governance environments (i.e., developed and developing counties). This may 
help in developing a better understanding of antecedents of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure 
in different CG environments. Additionally, and as explained above, data employed in the current 
study is primarily gathered from firms’ annual reports; however, annual reports can communicate 
mixed messages, as a result of that, future studies might collect data using qualitative approach, such 
as face-to-face interviews and case studies and this may allow providing a complete understanding of 
different drivers of voluntary CG compliance and disclosure. Also, the construction of a CG index 
may be improved by future studies in a number of ways: (i) by investigating whether the findings are 
sensitive or robust to different scoring schemes; and (ii) by surveying professional organisations 
about the weight and importance attached to CG provisions. This can help improve the reliability and 
validity of the constructed index. Finally, we mainly investigate the association between internal CG 
mechanisms and voluntary CG compliance and disclosure. As data become available, future studies 
can investigate the influence of external CG mechanisms (e.g. the market for corporate control), on 
CG compliance and disclosure.  
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Table 1. A Comparison of UK Corporate Governance Codes Since 1992. 
Corporate Governance  Provisions 1992 Cadbury Report 2010 UK Combined Code Other Relevant Reports 
Board Leadership    
Board structure Unitary board Unitary board Higgs Report 2003 
Role duality Split Chairperson and CEO Split Chairperson and CEO Combined Code 2003,2006 & 2008 
Chairperson  No one person with power of 
decision 
Chairman, of only one company, not  
executive or current CEO 
Higgs Report 2003 
Chairperson independence Non-executive director Independent non-executive directors Combined Code 2003,2006 & 2008 
Board meetings Frequently/ Regularly  Frequently/ Regularly Combined Code 2003,2006 & 2008 
Senior director Non-executive director Independent non-executive director Higgs Report 2003 
Effectiveness    
Outside directors 3 at least Majority of board members Higgs Report  & Combined code 
2003,2006 & 2008 
Independent outside directors 2 at least At least half of the board Higgs Report  & Combined code 
2003,2006 & 2008 
Remuneration’s committee 
composition 
Majority are outside directors Majority are independent outside 
directors 
Higgs Report  & Combined code 
2003,2006 & 2008 
Board, committees & individual 
evaluation 
Not specified   Annual evaluation  Higgs Report  & Combined code 
2003,2006 & 2008 
External evaluation Not specified  At least every three years Combined Code 2008 
Directors insider share dealing  Not specified  Not specified  Specified in Criminal Justice Act 1993, 
Part V  
Accountability    
Risk systems  Not specified  Risk management and internal 
control systems 
Turnbull  Report1999 & Smith Report 
2003 
Risk evaluation Not specified  Covered  Turnbull  Report1999 
Risk management committee Not specified  Composed of independent outside 
directors 
Smith Report 2003 
Internal audit  Establish internal audit function Establish internal audit function Smith Report 2003 
Audit committee composition At least 3 outside directors At least 3 independent outside 
directors 
Higgs Report  & Combined Code 
2003,2006 & 2008 
Financial experience of audit 
committee members 
Not specified At least one member Combined Code 2003,2006 & 2008 
Remuneration    
Remuneration committee 
composition 
Wholly or mainly of outside 
directors 
Majority independent outside 
directors 
Higgs Report  & Combined code 2003 
Disclosure of total directors’ 
remuneration  
Only chairman and highest-paid 
director 
For all directors Greenbury Report 1995 
Disclosure of individual directors’ 
remunerations 
Only chairman and highest-paid 
director 
For all directors Greenbury Report 1995 
Disclosure of directors’ share 
ownership 
Only chairman and highest-paid 
director 
For all directors  Greenbury Report 
Remuneration consultant  Not specified Appointed by the remuneration 
committee 
Specified in the Combined Code 
2003,2006 & 2008 
Say on pay Not specified Invite shareholders to approve all 
new long-term incentive schemes 
Listing rules (L.R 9.4) 
Relations with Shareholders    
Dialogue with shareholders  Regular meetings Sufficient meetings Combined Code 2003,2006 & 2008 
Shareholder activism Should be active Enter dialogue based on the mutual 
understanding of objectives 
Myners Report 2001 & Stewardship 
Code 2010/2012  
Attendance of chairmen of board 
committees to AGM 
Not specified Should be available to answer 
shareholders’ questions 
Combined Code 2008 
Obligation to society  Not specified  Not specified Hermes principles, 2002 & CA 2006 
Environment  Not specified  Not specified  Hermes principles, 2002 & CA 2006 
Health and safety  Not specified  Not specified  Specified in CA 2006 
Compliance Listing rules 
Comply or explain  
Listing rules 
Comply or explain 
Combined Code 2003,2006 & 2008 
Notes: collected from the Cadbury Report of 1992, the Combined Code of 2010 and the other named codes & reports. 
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Table 2. Variables Definition and Measurement. 
Corporate governance disclosures variables—quality/level measure (compliance and disclosure index) 
UKCGI CG compliance and disclosure index constituting 120 CG provisions extracted from the 2010 
Combined Code which assigns a value of one if disclosure is made in the annual reports of firms 
and zero otherwise. This then is scaled to a value ranging between 0% and 100%. 
  LSH Sub-index of UKCGI related to board’s leadership consisting of 8 provisions that is awarded a 
value of one if disclosure is made in the annual reports of firms about each of the 8 provisions and 
zero otherwise. This then is scaled to a value ranging between 0% and 100%. 
  ETIV Sub-index of UKCGI related to the effectiveness of corporate board consisting of 37 provisions 
that is awarded a value of one if disclosure is made in the annual reports of firms about each of the 
37 provisions and zero otherwise. This then is scaled to a value ranging between 0% and 100%. 
  ACNT Sub-index of UKCGI related to board’s accountability consisting of 36 provisions that is awarded a 
value of one if disclosure is made in the annual reports of firms about each of the 36 provisions and 
zero otherwise. This then is scaled to a value ranging between 0% and 100%. 
  REM Sub-index of UKCGI related to executive pay consisting of 22 provisions that is awarded a value of 
one if disclosure is made in the annual reports of firms about each of the 22 provisions and zero 
otherwise. This then is scaled to a value ranging between 0% and 100%. 
  RWS Sub-index of UKCGI related to relations with shareholders consisting of 17 provisions that is 
awarded a value of one if disclosure is made in the annual reports of firms about each of the 17 
provisions and zero otherwise. This then is scaled to a value ranging from 100% to 0%. 
Board and Ownership Characteristics Variables 
  BSE Natural log of the number of inside and outside directors. 
  IOE Number of independent outside directors divided by the number of corporate board members. 
  BDG Number of women divided by the number of corporate board members. 
  BDE Number of ethnic minority divided by the number of corporate board members. 
  BD Number of women and ethnic minority divided by the number of corporate board members. 
  PCGC 1, if a corporation set up a separate CG committee, 0 otherwise. 
  MANO Percentage of all directors’ ownership to total firm ordinary shareholdings. 
  ISTO Percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders to total firm ordinary shareholdings. 
  BLKO Percentage of block ownership with at least 3% of the total firm ordinary shareholdings. 
Control Variables 
  LTA Natural log of total assets of a firm. 
  LAG Natural log of firm age in years. 
  CEX Total capital expenditure divided by total assets. 
  SG Sales of this year minus the sales of previous year to the sales of the previous year. 
  GR Total debt divided by total assets. 
  Q Book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus market value of equity to the book 
value of total assets. 
  IDU A dummy variable for each of the five industries: basic material and oil & gas (BM&OG), 
consumer goods (CGODS), consumer services and health care (CSER&HCARE), industrial 
(INDUSTR), and technology and communication (TECH&COMUN). 
  YDU Dummy variables for the years 2008-2013. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics. 
      
High – Low UKCGI 
 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Mean 
Diff. 
Median 
Diff. 
Panel A: the UKCGI Based on All 600 Firm-Years 
  UKCGI (%) 61.73 64.58 14.53 20.00 94.17 - - 
  LSH (%) 79.35 87.50 18.02 12.50 100.0 - - 
 ETIV (%) 59.01 64.86 18.33 13.51 91.89 - - 
 ACNT (%) 52.94 52.78 12.86 11.11 97.22 - - 
 REM (%) 77.58 81.82 15.00 4.55 100.0 - - 
 RWS (%) 57.50 58.82 22.71 5.88 100.0 - - 
Panel B: Firms with High UKCGI  
  UKCGI (%) 71.91 72.50 6.01 62.50 94.20 - - 
  LSH (%) 75.36 75.00 16.89 13.00 100.0 - - 
 ETIV (%) 52.55 56.76 17.01 13.51 83.78 - - 
 ACNT (%) 48.41 50.00 10.82 11.11 75.00 - - 
 REM (%) 74.38 77.27 12.42 40.91 90.91 - - 
 RWS (%) 48.40 47.06 22.08 5.88 94.12 - - 
Panel C: Firms with Low UKCGI  
  UKCGI (%) 47.77 50.83 10.69 20.0 61.67 - - 
  LSH (%) 84.83 87.50 18.10 25.0 100.0 - - 
 ETIV (%) 67.87 70.27 16.28 18.92 91.89 - - 
 ACNT (%) 59.15 61.11 12.86 13.89 97.22 - - 
 REM (%) 81.96 86.36 17.03 4.55 100.0 - - 
 RWS (%) 69.98 64.71 16.91 35.29 100.0 - - 
Panel D: Independent (Board and Ownership Characteristics) Variables  
  BSE 9.00 8.00 3.46 3.00 18.00   2.30*** 3.00*** 
  IOE (%) 59.11 60.00 17.66 10.00 92.86 17.12*** 19.23*** 
  BDG (%) 10.27 10.00 10.42 0.00 50.00   3.66*** 11.11*** 
  BDE (%) 1.37 0.00 3.98 0.00 25.00 0.56* 0.00*** 
  BD (%) 11.65 11.11 11.40 0.00 50.00   4.22*** 7.45*** 
  PCGC (%) 14.33 0.00 35.07 0.00 100.0   7.70*** 0.00*** 
  MANO (%) 5.95 0.58 11.40 0.005 52.37   -9.40*** -2.67*** 
  ISTO (%) 38.38 36.38 20.70 3.07 97.49   -8.14*** -6.97*** 
  BLKO (%) 42.62 43.20 21.55 3.07 98.08  -17.81*** -19.06*** 
Panel E: Control  Variables 
  TA(£m) 177,43.64 431.25 418,59.28 0.983 274,507.71 8,140.76** 3,457.49*** 
  AG 58.19 38.00 46.59 3.00 199.00   2.73     4.00 
  CEX (%) 4.99 3.70 4.14 0.42 14.73   0.26     0.65 
  SG (%) 7.61 5.65 18.60 -23.77 52.04   0.99     5.22 
  GR (%) 21.29 18.98 14.82 1.57 53.20       9.45*** 10.07*** 
  Q 0.54 0.56 0.23 0.01 1.66       0.10***  0.15*** 
Variables of the study are described as follows: the UK CG compliance and disclosure index (UKCGI);  leadership sub-index 
(LSH); effectiveness sub-index (ETIV); accountability sub-index (ACNT); remuneration sub-index (REM); relations with 
shareholders sub-index (RWS);  board size (BSE); the proportion of independent outside directors (IOE); board diversity based on 
gender (BDG); board ethnic diversity (BDE); board gender and ethnicity diversity (BD); existence of a separate CG committee 
(PCGC); managerial ownership (MANO); institutional ownership (ISTO); block ownership (BLKO); firm size (LTA); firm age 
(LAG); capital expenditure (CEX); sales growth (SG); Gearing (GR); and profitability (Q). The mean/median differences for the 
sampled corporations are presented in the last two columns. ***, **, and * imply significance of the mean and median differences 
between corporations with high CG ranking (i.e., corporations having a UKCGI score higher than 61.73% value); and (ii) 
corporations with low CG ranking (i.e., corporations having a UKCGI score lower than 61.73% value) at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels respectively. 
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Table 4. Correlation Matrix.     
Variable UKCGI BSE IOE BDG BDE BD PCGC MANO ISTO BLKO LTA LAG CEX SG GR Q 
  UKCGI  .487*** .532*** .337*** .252*** .367*** .173*** -.601*** -.258***  -.503***  .533***  .088** .128***  .066  .317*** .251*** 
  BSE .444***  .519*** .314*** .340*** .381***  .157*** -.619*** -.313*** -.541*** .809*** .069* .121*** .089** .245*** .220*** 
  IOE .489*** .458***  .268*** .219*** .308*** ..250*** -.684*** -.146*** -.367*** .700*** .113*** .261*** .044 .265*** .120*** 
  BDG .303*** .256*** .239***  .117*** .947*** .184*** -.348*** -.249*** -318*** .366*** .247*** .095** -.014 .281*** .196*** 
  BDE .156*** .290*** .161***  .067  .403*** .004 -.197*** -.052 -.233*** .286*** -.050 .120*** .017 .010 -.038 
  BD .332*** .335*** .275***  .938*** .410***  .165*** -.367*** -.255*** -.364*** .418*** .210*** .126*** -.007 .248*** .151*** 
  PCGC .157*** .144*** .233*** .170*** -.021 .148**  -.231*** -.047 -.081** .211*** -.184*** .086* -.046 .222*** .019 
  MANO -.420*** -.361*** -.352*** -.037  -.027 -.043  .006  .159*** .466*** -.754*** -.121*** -.156*** -.036 -.355*** -.297*** 
  ISTO -.280*** -.266*** -.106**  -.218*** -.078* -.225*** -.034  .025  .748*** -.260*** -.141*** .019 -.100** -.182*** -.166*** 
  BLKO -.485*** -.517*** -.312***  -.291*** -.240*** -.349*** -.090**  .291*** .722***  -.531*** -.182*** .002 -.095** -.252*** -.233*** 
  LTA .447*** .809*** .658*** .331*** .243*** .388*** .216*** -.446*** -.209***  -.493***  .149*** .189*** .128*** .306*** .268*** 
  LAG .100** .096** .128***  .227***  .001 .208***  -.173*** -.059 -.169*** -.202*** .173***  -.046 .010 .084* .137*** 
  CEX .070* .096** .211***  .065 .108*** .097** .018 -.028 .086** .091** .151**  -.047  .103** .003 -.111*** 
  SG .022 .091** .034 -.039  .020 -.029  -.026 .004 -.057 -.045 .109*** -.010 .102**  -.014 -.019 
  GR .302** .248*** .203*** .257***  -.017 .226***  .251*** -.220*** -.139*** -.216*** .288*** .001 -.033  -.020  .450*** 
  Q .250*** .190*** .094** .127*** -.034 .104** .011 -.256***  -.187*** -.207*** .251***  .087** -.106*** -.051 .445***  
***, ** and * indicate that correlations among variables are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (2-tailed) respectively. The bottom left side of the table presents the coefficients relating to Person’s correlation, 
whilst the top right side of the table provides the coefficients relating to Spearman’s correlation. Variables of the study are described as follows: the UK CG compliance and disclosure index (UKCGI);  board size 
(BSE); the proportion of independent outside directors (IOE); board diversity based on gender (BDG); board ethnic diversity (BDE);  board gender and ethnic diversity (BD); the existence of a separate CG committee 
(PCGC); managerial ownership (MANO); institutional ownership (ISTO); block ownership (BLKO); firm size (LTA); firm age (LAG); capital expenditure (CEX); sales growth (SG); Gearing (GR); and profitability 
(Q). 
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Table 5. Antecedents of Voluntary Compliance and Disclosure of Good CG Practices. 
Indep. Variables 
(Model) 
Dependent variable 
UKCGI 
   (1) 
UKCGI 
    (2) 
UKCGI 
   (3)       
UKCGI 
   (4)       
UKCGI 
   (5)       
UKCGI 
   (6)           VIF 
Board Mechanisms  
  
  BSE 0.104*** 
(.000) 
- 
 
0.038*** 
(.007) 
0.130*** 
(.000) 
- 
 
0.095*** 
(.000) 
3.697 
 
  IOE 0.238*** 
(.000) 
- 
 
0.207*** 
(.000) 
0.198*** 
(.000) 
- 
 
0.198*** 
(.000) 
2.093 
 
  BD 0.163*** 
(.000) 
- 
 
0.178*** 
(.000) 
0.099** 
(.049) 
- 
 
0.117** 
(.014) 
1.467 
 
PCGC 0.006 
(.938) 
- 
 
0.006 
(.707) 
0.004 
(.835) 
- 
 
0.015 
(.366) 
1.309 
 
Ownership Mechanisms 
    
   MANO - -0.371*** 
(.000) 
-0.197*** 
(.000) 
- -0.328*** 
(.000) 
-0.277*** 
(.000) 
1.403 
 
   ISTO - 0.056 
(.123) 
0.005 
(.885) 
- 0.041 
(.260) 
0.045 
(.163) 
2.269 
 
   BLKO  - -0.334*** 
(.000) 
-0.173*** 
(.000) 
- -0.289*** 
(.000) 
-0.245*** 
(.000) 
3.510 
 
Control variables 
  
  
LTA  - - - -0.001 
(.890) 
0.005** 
(.049) 
-0.012*** 
(.002) 
3.905 
 
   LAG - - - 0.005 
(.375) 
0.003 
(.631) 
-0.004 
(.496) 
1.297 
 
   CEX  - - - 0.055 
(.671) 
0.507*** 
(.000) 
0.381*** 
(.002) 
1.254 
 
   SG - - - 0.010 
(.752) 
0.014 
(.673) 
0.006 
(.831) 
1.311 
 
   GR  - - - 0.107*** 
(.009) 
0.122*** 
(.002) 
0.080** 
(.028) 
1.541 
 
Q - - - 0.003 
(.917) 
0.007 
(.787) 
-0.004 
(.868) 
1.560 
 
IDU - - -    YES YES YES - 
YDU - - -    YES YES YES - 
Constant 0.246*** 0.764*** 0.491***   0.198*** 0.583*** 0.630*** - 
Durbin-W. 1.782 1.807 1.904   1.914 1.883 1.965 - 
F- value 75.988*** 90.564*** 63.239***    17.043*** 20.639*** 21.758*** - 
Adj. R2 0.340 0.322 0.443   0.374 0.417 0.485 - 
N. Observations  600 600 600 600 600 600 - 
P-values are between brackets. ***, ** and * indicate that the relationships are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. Variables of the study are described as follows: the UK CG compliance and disclosure index (UKCGI);  board 
size (BSE); the proportion of independent outside directors (IOE); board diversity based on gender and ethnicity (BD); the 
existence of a separate CG committee (PCGC); managerial ownership (MANO); institutional ownership (ISTO); block 
ownership (BLKO); firm size (LTA); firm age (LAG); capital expenditure (CEX); sales growth (SG); Gearing (GR); and 
profitability (Q).  
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Table 6. Antecedents of Voluntary Compliance and Disclosure of Good CG Practices. 
Indep. Variables 
(Model) 
Dependent variables 
UKCGI 
   (1) 
LSH 
  (2) 
ETIV 
  (3)       
ACNT 
   (4)       
REM 
  (5)       
RWS 
  (6)       
Board mechanisms  
 
  BSE 0.104*** 
(.000) 
0.022 
(.522) 
0.147*** 
(.000) 
0.060*** 
(.008) 
0.078*** 
(.000) 
0.133*** 
(.001) 
  IOE 0.201*** 
(.000) 
0.350*** 
(.000) 
0.345*** 
(.000) 
0.132*** 
(.001) 
0.127*** 
(.000) 
0.039 
(.536) 
  BDG 0.176*** 
(.001) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
  BDE -0.213* 
(.066) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
  BD - 0.193*** 
(.010) 
0.144** 
(.015) 
0.065 
(.193) 
0.132*** 
(.005) 
0.113 
(.182) 
  PCGC 0.009 
(.591) 
0.010 
(.712) 
0.054*** 
(.009) 
0.019 
(.272) 
0.023 
(.151) 
-0.079*** 
(.007) 
Ownership mechanisms 
    
  MANO -0.264*** 
(.000) 
-0.320*** 
(.000) 
-0.264*** 
(.000) 
-0.141** 
(.011) 
-0.405*** 
(.000) 
-0.410*** 
(.000) 
  ISTO 0.060* 
(.064) 
-0.020 
(.688) 
0.118*** 
(.004) 
0.010 
(.768) 
-0.001 
(.981) 
0.050 
(.386) 
  BLKO  -0.260*** 
(.000) 
-0.231*** 
(.000) 
-0.349*** 
(.000) 
-0.178*** 
(.000) 
-0.246*** 
(.000) 
-0.167** 
(.015) 
Control variables 
  
 
LTA  -0.012*** 
(.000) 
-0.013** 
(.035) 
-0.024*** 
(.000) 
-0.003 
(.460) 
0.017*** 
(.000) 
0.004 
(.592) 
   LAG -0.005 
(.399) 
-0.009 
(.276) 
0.011* 
(.099) 
-0.005 
(.416) 
0.005 
(.392) 
-0.043*** 
(.000) 
   CEX  0.392*** 
(.001) 
0.398** 
(.039) 
0.571*** 
(.000) 
0.301** 
(.019) 
0.137 
(.249) 
0.443** 
(.041) 
   SG 0.004 
(.893) 
-0.006 
(.892) 
-0.002 
(.947) 
-0.011 
(.720) 
-0.015 
(.606) 
0.095* 
(.069) 
   GR  0.070* 
(.053) 
0.107* 
(.064) 
0.035 
(.446) 
0.043 
(.258) 
0.066* 
(.064) 
0.260*** 
(.000) 
Q -0.005 
(.831) 
-0.041 
(.319) 
-0.049 
(.130) 
-0.002 
(.930) 
0.030 
(.244) 
0.063 
(.173) 
IDU YES YES YES    YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES YES     YES YES YES 
Constant 0.613*** 1.006*** 0.650***   0.468*** 0.958*** 0.324*** 
Durbin-W. 1.972 2.369 2.003   1.864 2.027 2.149 
F- value 21.631*** 9.320*** 21.834***    12.203*** 19.701*** 15.332*** 
Adj. R2 0.495 0.274 0.486  0.337 0.459 0.394 
N. Observations 600 600 600 600 600 600 
P-values are between brackets. ***, ** and * indicate that the relationships are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10 levels, respectively. Variables of the study are described as follows: the UK CG compliance and disclosure 
index (UKCGI); leadership sub-index (LSH); effectiveness sub-index (ETIV); accountability sub-index (ACNT); 
remuneration sub-index (REM); relations with shareholders sub-index (RWS);  board size (BSE); the proportion 
of independent outside directors (IOE); board diversity based on gender (BDG); board ethnic diversity (BDE);  
board gender and ethnic diversity (BD); the existence of a separate CG committee (PCGC); managerial 
ownership (MANO); institutional ownership (ISTO); block ownership (BLKO); firm size (LTA); firm age 
(LAG); capital expenditure (CEX); sales growth (SG); Gearing (GR); and profitability (Q).  
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Table 7. Robustness Analysis of  Antecedents of Voluntary Compliance and Disclosure of Good CG Practices 
(Model) 
W-UKCGI 
   (1) 
Non-linearity 
  (2) 
Lagged-Effects 
  (3)       
2SLS 
   (4)       
Fixed-Effects 
  (5)       
Board Mechanisms  
  BSE 0.079*** 
(.000) 
0.631*** 
(.000) 
0.110*** 
(.008) 
0.923*** 
(.000) 
0.099*** 
(.000) 
  BSE2 - 
 
-0.136*** 
(.000) 
- 
 
 
- 
 
  IOE 0.199*** 
(.000) 
0.178*** 
(.000) 
0.299*** 
(.000) 
2.144*** 
(.000) 
0.227*** 
(.000) 
  BD 0.130*** 
(.008) 
0.109** 
(.015) 
0.121** 
(.020) 
9.224*** 
(.000) 
0.164** 
(.000) 
PCGC 0.002 
(.926) 
0.004 
(.800) 
0.020 
(.263) 
0.060 
(.511) 
0.009 
(.639) 
Ownership Mechanisms 
   
  MANO -0.308*** 
(.000) 
-0.488*** 
(.002) 
-0.301*** 
(.000) 
-2.785*** 
(.000) 
-0.430*** 
(.000) 
  MANO2 - 
 
0.764** 
(.042) 
- - 
 
- 
 
  ISTO 0.031 
(.341) 
0.184 
(.185) 
0.038 
(.261) 
1.592*** 
(.000) 
0.002 
(.948) 
  ISTO2 - 
 
-0.204 
(.159) 
- - 
 
- 
 
  BLKO  -0.234*** 
(.000) 
0.471*** 
(.002) 
-0.258*** 
(.000) 
-0.616*** 
(.000) 
-0.102*** 
(.004) 
  BLKO2 - -0.755*** 
(.000) 
- 
- 
- 
 
Control Variables 
  
LTA  -0.011*** 
(.007) 
0.004 
(.271) 
-0.020*** 
(.000) 
-0.354*** 
(.000) 
-0.014*** 
(.005) 
   LAG -0.008 
(.145) 
-0.011** 
(.024) 
-0.005 
(.408) 
-0.155*** 
(.000) 
-0.050*** 
(.000) 
   CEX  0.370*** 
(.003) 
0.357*** 
(.001) 
0.309** 
(.019) 
-2.842*** 
(.000) 
0.348*** 
(.000) 
   SG 0.012 
(.686) 
-0.019 
(.458) 
0.017 
(.568) 
0.507*** 
(.000) 
-0.008 
(.596) 
   GR  0.102*** 
(.006) 
0.093*** 
(.004) 
0.089** 
(.023) 
1.044*** 
(.000) 
0.084** 
(.018) 
Q -0.007 
(.100) 
-0.038 
(.110) 
0.024 
(.376) 
-0.690*** 
(.000) 
-0.031 
(.175) 
IDU YES YES    YES YES YES 
YDU YES YES    YES YES YES  
Constant 0.681*** -0.296**   0.697*** 3.637*** 0.270*** 
Durbin-W. 2.059 1.855   1.910 1.965 1.959 
F- value 21.041*** 29.655***    25.325*** 21.758*** 49.885*** 
Adj. R2 0.477 0.606    0.552 0.485 0.893 
N. Observations 600 600  500 600 600 
P-values are between brackets. ***, ** and * indicate that the relationships are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
levels, respectively. Variables of the study are described as follows: the UK CG compliance and disclosure index 
(UKCGI); board size (BSE); board size squared (BSE2); the proportion of independent outside directors (IOE); board 
gender and ethnicity diversity (BD); the existence of a separate CG committee (PCGC); managerial ownership 
(MANO); managerial ownership squared (MANO2); institutional ownership (ISTO); institutional ownership squared 
(ISTO2); block ownership (BLKO); block ownership squared (BLKO2); firm size (LTA); firm age (LAG); capital 
expenditure (CEX); sales growth (SG); Gearing (GR); and profitability (Q).  
